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Semiotic Inquiry in Education
Donald J. Cunningham
In this paper I present the view that inquiry in education can profit from insights from
semiotics. Semiotics holds that cognition, or semiosis, is the building up of structures
of signs from experience. We create a personal world, an Umwelt, that determines
what we perceive and know. The environment also "affords" various structures and
these affordances offer special ways to interact with the environment. In this model,
inquiry is seen as the perception of affordance, a process whereby we come to read the
environment as a system of signs. An example is offered.
In previous papers (e.g., Cunningham,
1987; 1992; see also 1998) I have presented
summaries of semiotic models of cognition
and compared them with the currently
dominant information processing models of
cognition. I have argued that semiotics offers
a genuine new foundation for education and
that to regard education as fostering semiosis, or sign use, promises to offer insights
into the learning process which will
revolutionize educational practice. A criticism which has been raised frequently about
semiotics is that it appears to lack any
contact with an empirical agenda. Colleagues have told me that they could be more
comfortable with semiotics if it had clearer
implications for research. Can semiotics
promote any kind of empirical program? Are
semiotics and empiricism compatible? This
is an important issue and its resolution is
related to the fundamental assumptions
underlying semiotics. It will first be necessary to review those assumptions.

Deely's Umwelt Model of Cognition
For those unfamiliar with semiotic
models of cognition, this section briefly
describes John Deely's (1982) Umwelt
model. Others may skip to the next section.
Deely's Umwelt model, a term borrowed
from the late 19th-early 20th century
biologist, Jacob von Uexkiill, applies equally
well to humans and other animals and,

perhaps, also to life on earth (i.e., plants,
microbes, etc.). Uexkiill was interested in
characterizing how animals picture the world
in their mind and how they then interact with
the world as they have circumscribed it.
Since animals can only respond to a small
portion of the total sensory information
available, they create, both as a species and
as individual members of a species, an
Umwelt, a "subjective environment" which
details only those aspects of the physical
world which are important (i.e., to be
approached, avoided, ignored, etc.). It is
crucial to understand the difference between
an Umwelt and an environment. An
environment is a physical setting that can be
conceived of independently of any particular
organism and, in fact, is usually said to exist
for all organisms. This separation of
organism and environment is a fundamental
tenet of behavioral and cognitive information
processing models of cognition. The Umwelt
of an organism, however, is not independent
of the organism; in fact, it exists only in
relation to the organism. Any particular
physical entity can serve an enormous
variety of Umwelts: the Empire State
Building in New York City can create a
shelter from the rain for humans, a nesting
site for cockroaches, a landing site for pigeons, a landmark for cab drivers, a climbing
post for King Kong, and so forth. In all
cases, the environment of the building is the
same; that is, the sheltered enclosure, the
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crevices, the flat surfaces, etc. are available
to each of the organisms, yet their experience
of them is quite different.
Through experience in the world and
mediated by the sensory and perceptual
capacities of the organism, the Umwelt
emerges; that is, the tools for developing an
Umwelt are present from birth but each
individual's Umwelt is developed by
particular activities and by species-specific
characteristics. Via this process, the animal
comes to terms with the physical environment, creating and living in a world uniquely
defined for that species and that individual.
Yet the Umwelt is not static (i.e., in
equilibrium) but in a constant state of flux
b<ilth at the species and individual levels.
Semiosis in humans, while based upon
the processes described thus far, is
qualitatively different from that of other
organisms. Humans can create signs which
go beyond the immediate experience of the
cognizing organism. Words, pictures, bodily
movements, and the like generate signs for
objects which need have no basis in the real
world and which can be manipulated
independent of that world. Yet these signs
come to form a part of the Umwelt of
humans in the same way that dark crevices
do for an insect. It is the intervention of
language, according to Deely, that allows
humans to engage in this type of semiosis.
Through language, we create culture: governments, armies, schools, art, professional
associations, etc. Culture, in tum, impacts
our lives by determining what is important,
what makes sense, what is to be valued, etc.
The arbitrary nature of these signs, their lack
of true reality status, is not readily apparent
to the human organism until they are
exposed to cultural systems which depart
from their own.
The fact that humans can utilize signs
which are arbitrary and need have no
existence in their immediate experience is
what makes thought possible and distinctly
human. Experience comes to be represented
by linguistic signs that can be created

without any actual embodiments in the
physical world. But these signs come to be
part of our Umwelt-we tend to see the
world anew once some aspect of culture is
created or adopted.
Deely's account is essentially a model of
inference drawing upon Peirce's trichotomy
of abduction, deduction, and induction.
Semiosis is a process of applying signs to
understand some phenomena (induction),
reasoning from sign to sign (deduction), and/
or inventing signs to make sense of some
new experience (abduction). These modes of
inference are cyclic, characterizing the
development of Umwelts throughout life:
signs are invented to account for experience;
these signs are linked to existing sign
structures and then used to define the
Umwelt for that organism. But the world is
not infinitely malleable to our sign structures
and the abductive process will be again
instigated. Deely is here, in my view,
incorporating growth into his model, both
from the perspective of ontology and
experience.

Semiotic Inquiry
In this paper, I argue that se1IDot1c
inquiry can be regarded as the perception of
affordance. I have borrowed the term affordance from J. J. Gibson's (1979) ecological
approach to perception. Gibson rejects
sensation-based theories of perception which
regard the perceiver as a passive receiver of
impoverished stimulus energy which is
somehow transformed from a retinal image
into a percept. His ecological optics abandons the sensation-perception distinction and
proposes instead an ecological model of an
active perceiver confronting an information
rich environment. Gibson's notion of
environment is very compatible with the idea
of the Umwelt. For Gibson, an environment
is that which organisms perceive, not the
physical world which a physicist might
describe. The term refers to the "surroundings" of an organism on a scale appropriate
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for terrestrial animals (i.e., in terms of
terrains, objects, and events which are
appropriate for organisms on this planetsizes between centimeters and meters, times
between seconds and hours, etc.). For
Gibson, the words organism and environment are an inseparable pair ... each implies
the other. One cannot talk of an environment
in general, but only of an environment with
respect to a particular animal.
The terrestrial environment, unlike the
physical environment, consists of a medium,
substances, and surfaces that separate the
medium from substances. The medium for
humans is the gaseous atmosphere, the "air"
which permits unimpeded locomotion from
place to place, seeing, smelling, feeling, and
hearing of substances. In our world, the
medium has an absolute axis of reference,
the vertical axis defined by gravity.
Substances are the "things" of the world, the
objects or "furniture" which occupy the
terrestrial surface. Unlike the medium,
substances do not permit locomotion or
transmit light. Substances are heterogeneous
whereas the medium is relatively homogeneous. Surfaces separate the medium from
substances. It is at the level of surface where
all of the action in visual perception takes
place. We do not perceive the medium or
substances but only surfaces where the
medium and substances meet. A surface is
said to have a layout (form), texture, the
property of being lighted or shaded, and the
property of a certain fraction of the
illumination falling on it.
To make a very long story much too
short, visual perception arises when structured information from surfaces is perceived.
The ambient optical array (this structured
information available in light) is described
by Gibson as visual solid angles with a
common apex at the point of observation.
They are angles of intercept which change as
the observer moves or the surface(s) under
observation move. But other aspects of the
array do not change (e.g., the layout and
reflectance). The perceptual system monitors

those things that change and those things that
persist, and from this information perception
is developed. Perception is thus a process
which develops from the interaction of an
active perceiver in an informationally rich
environment which is constantly in flux.
Perception can be understood as picking up
or reading information available in the
environment.
Of primary importance to our purposes
here is Gibson's theory of affordances. As
noted above, Gibson considers the
environment to be the surfaces that separate
substances from the medium in which
animals live. But environments also afford
things (such as shelter, locomotion, etc.).
There is information in light for perception
but also for the perception of what surfaces
afford. To perceive something is to perceive
what it affords, its value or meaning. To
quote Gibson, "The affordances of the
environment are what it offers the animal,
what it provides or furnishes, either for good
or ill" (p. 127). But affordances do not exist
independent of an animal; the term refers to
both the environment and the animal. "An
affordance is neither an objective property
nor a subjective property; or it is both if you
like ... (it) points both ways, to the
environment and the observer" (p. 129). The
terrestrial surface, for example may be
horizontal, flat, extended, and rigid, thus
affording support to certain terrestrial animals. But this affordance is relative to
particular terrestrial animals, not an abstract
property of the physical world.
The process of perceiving affordances is
called "information pick-up," unfortunately
the least developed aspect of Gibson's
theory. Affordances are invariants available
in the ambient optic array and perception of
affordances results from monitoring those
aspects of the ambient optic array which
persist and those which change. Note that
this conception places the affordance in the
light, not in the needs or motives of the
observer. The potential affordance of a paper
clip as a replacement for a fishhook is
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available whether or not it is perceived by a
particular organism to which the affordance
is relevant.
In my current thinking, the concept of
affordance is very relevant to semiotic
models of cognition such as those described
above. In Deely's model, for example,
abduction is a mode of inferencing whereby
organisms attempt to make sense of the
world by creating and using sign structures.
In other words, abduction can be thought of
as the perception of affordance. In essence
this process has been likened by Shank
(1987) to "reading" the environment. But is
our reading free to take any possible form?
Can the Umwelt we create be entirely
independent of those aspects of the environment relevant to us as a species or as an
individual? A fruitful area of research for
semioticians will be to investigate the
possibilities of affordance-like constancies in
our worlds. Such an approach will, however,
require a change in the concept of affordance
as described by Gibson. Gibson's work was
an account of visual perception and although
he tried to extend his ideas to account for
knowing and remembering, he was not
successful , in my opinion. While it makes
little difference to a cockroach whether the
enclosure he perceives as affording shelter is
a crevice in a cave or in a school building,
these two enclosures have quite different
import to humans. The extension of the
notion of affordance to the social and
cultural aspects of human semiosis remains
to be worked out and will result, in my
opinion, in some fundamental changes in its
definition, away from its realist origin to an
interactionist one.
Yet there is something compelling about
this idea of "reading" the environment to
determine what aspects of it persist and what
aspects change over time and circumstance.
Take a typical secondary classroom. Are
there affordance-like constancies in this
situation that can be read? Clearly the
readings can be numerous and relevant to a
wide variety of perspectives and contexts.

We can analyze the ideational character of
the classroom discourse (e.g. , Lemke, 1987),
observe the social interactions among the
students, chart the patterns of student and
teacher questions and answers, and so on and
so forth. To what extent do the particular
events and circumstances we observe lead us
to the identification of this as a classroom, a
pedagogical technique of a certain type?
What is essential (persistent) and what is
changing (variable)? Do certain metaphors
seem to account for our observations better
than others?
The underlying motivation of such
research is that over time it will eventually
lead to ever more adequate conceptions of
the affordances available in this stimulus
information. Like Peirce, I believe that our
inquiry will eventually lead us closer to
reality, to an understanding of the world as it
is, unmediated by signs. But since this quest
is of the nature of all cognition, why should
our inquiry be any different? Semiotics is
quite compatible with empiricism but the
metaphor guiding the inquiry is one of reading the affordances available in the situation/
circumstance under study using methods
undoubtedly more compatible with naturalist
inquiry than experimental research. Where
the latter seeks to identify the component
variables which account for a particular
observation, semiotic research seeks to
provide a variety of interpretations and
perspectives for understanding. While such
an approach does not eliminate the threat of
solipsism for semiotics, a more adequate
account of the nature of the physical world
will help insure that our inquiry has
consensual validity.

An Example
Let me close with an example of a
"reading" which I think raises some exciting
and, for some, disturbing implications for
educational practice. For over 25 years I
have been haunted by a delightful little book
by J. M. Stephens entitled The Process of
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Schooling (Stephens, 1976). In his book,
Stephens speculates on the very existence of
schools, on the forces from which they arose
and which account for the characteristics
they possess today. According to Stephens,
schools did not arise from any planned,
deliberate decisions of any group or society.
Rather, schools arose from some primitive,
spontaneous tendencies for survival that
emerged as mankind developed. To survive,
any species must attain proficiency in certain
behaviors and any group which is successful
in nurturing these behaviors is more likely to
survive. Human groups which neglect to
inform their offspring of the dangers of
playing in traffic or touching power lines, for
example, are unlikely to survive very long.
One mechanism which has evolved to
facilitate the acquisition of certain behaviors
is the family. Typically, the family is
responsible for nurturing those behaviors
which have urgent survival value such as
eating, bodily elimination, safety, and so
forth. These behaviors are those which arise
automatically in the course of interacting
with the child and for which parents seem to
give automatic expression.
Other behaviors which the child may
emit, those which Stephens characterizes as
"playful, manipulative tendencies," receive
less parental concern and attention: skipping
stones on the water, drawing pictures in the
sand, playing with one's fingers, etc. While
these behaviors may have no immediate
survival value for an individual, Stephens
argues that groups (e.g., societies) which
nurture such frivolous behaviors are more
likely to survive than those which do not.
Thus, while "fooling around" with numbers
or words or pictures is unlikely to influence
the life expectancy of an individual, the longrange benefits to the survivability of the
group may be enormous (e.g., Robert
Goddard's rocket experiments in the early
1900s eventually led to a number of
important applications).
Schools have arisen to nurture just such
tendencies. Whether a child can sing, write a

poem, or even read and calculate is of less
urgent concern than whether the child could
negotiate the basement stairs. Parents may
feel some remote or indulgent concern over
reading and mathematics and even undertake
to instruct the child in these but, in the main,
responsibility for such behaviors has been
relegated to the school. Stephens holds that
all or most societies which have survived
have evolved something akin to a school and,
in fact, the school has contributed greatly to
the survival of those societies. However,
schools did not emerge from a rational
decision-making process within the group.
Rather, schools are the outcome of the
evolutionary demand of blind, automatic
forces present in human beings, a bit more in
some people than in others.
Stephens proposes two categories of
these automatic forces which may have
played a crucial role in the emergence of
schools. First, he proposes a category of
playful, manipulative tendencies in humans
which might be akin to what others have
called exploratory or curiosity tendencies
(e.g., Berlyne, 1960). These behaviors are
usually devoid of any immediate utility but
often occur in preference to more utilitarian
behavior (e.g., witness the recent video game
craze). Second, Stephens proposes an
"extremely powerful but unpremeditated
tendency to communicate" (p. 8). Manifestations of this tendency include our
spontaneous, seemingly unthinking attempts
to tell others of our interests and to react to
others who tell us their interests ( witness the
behavior of the participants at an academic
conference, for example).
Societies which have survived across
history are those strong in these tendencies
and it is out of these particular tendencies
that schooling has emerged. For Stephens,
the essence of schooling is that it nurtures
playful, manipulative tendencies in humans
which may have long-range survival value
for the society. This nurturance is accomplished by placing children in contact with
adults who possess a high degree of com-
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municative tendency, who enjoy expressing
their interests and reacting to the interests
and experiences of the children. A teacher
interested in geography and possessed of
strong communicative tendencies will presumably interact with students on these
matters and induce some reaction on the part
of the students. It matters little what
particular content is communicated or the
form which this communication takes. What
is important, what schools afford, is the
engagement of learning, of the interaction
between students and highly communicative
teachers about interesting, if nonessential,
ideas. Whether that interaction concerns
geography, gypsy moths, leprosy, or semiotics or is presented via lecture, textbook,
computer-assisted instruction, or on opposite
ends of a log is of little consequence relative
to the fact that communication takes place
among inherently curious people.
This is not the place to debate the merits
of this "reading" of schooling. My purpose is
simply to show that a semiotic view of
education and educational inquiry can lead
to interesting and testable hypotheses. This is
the essence of abduction, a process as
fundamental to an individual's cognition as it
is to the inquiry process. For too long we
have limited our inquiry to probing the
implications of a consensual "reading," the
currently popular paradigm. My message is
that we should step back and examine the
bases of that "reading" and consider others,
which may be equally valid. Semiotic
inquiry is the best means I know to
accomplish this.
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